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about the so-called Luxembourg Opera- alert plans.9 Among other things, the catalog At least as early as 1973, the GDR
tional Direction (sic!): provided a meticulous list of known indica- political leadership was well aware of
NATO has devoted great attention to tors of an attack and the corresponding warn- NATO s approach to the use of nuclear
the preparation and construction of ing times. weapons.10 That year, the NVA s intelli-
defenses and barriers. . . . A high con- For example, the catalog accurately re- gence director wrote, on the basis of his
centration of defenses . . . is in place at ported that at Alert Level II (4-6 days before knowledge of the WINTEX-73 exercise, the
a depth of some 50 to 70 km just west war would start), the depth of NATO s fron- following assessment: WINTEX-73: . . . a
of the borders of the GDR and CSSR.8 tier defenses might extend up to 100 kilome- further gradation of nuclear weapons use,
These defenses could be found in spe- ters. Such information would be crucial for even at the latest possible moment after a
18 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
100-km invading depth was achieved by territorial forces) could simply be increased Only a few insiders could see through
Warsaw Pact troops . . . . by 2 corps with a total of 12 divisions. By this mechanism of falsification. Normal
An internal report prepared by the supplementing this with other deliberately staffers and NVA troops, as well as the
deputy director of intelligence, General false information, NVA planners could cre- broader population, had no correct informa-
Gottwald, for the defense minister in 1988 ate the illusion of a 6-to-1 NATO force tion at their disposal that would have en-
confirms that he had a completely accurate advantage in the Berlin Direction, which abled them to challenge the official figures
understanding of the policy that NATO had certainly appeared to be an alarming threat. when negotiations began on Conventional
long maintained regarding the possible se- Considering that such manipulations went Forces in Europe (CFE). The convincing
lective use of nuclear weapons.11 An atten- on for many years, it is not surprising that as way that these assessments of the enemy
tive reader of the report would note that late as August 1990 (!), at a command train- were presented gave them even greater cred-
NATO s military strategy [is] oriented more ing session of a military district, NATO was ibility.
strongly toward a selective use of nuclear depicted as harboring far-reaching aggres- In the three examples cited above it is
weapons ... H sive intentions. clear that in the GDR, and within the NVA
Briefing documents on Probable Naturally, the NVA s intelligence di- itself, all information about NATO s armed
Groupings and Activities of NATO s Armed rectors at the time did individually have, in forces and operational plans was suppressed
Forces, prepared for troops in an instruc- their spheres of responsibility, an accurate or kept secret if it in any way revealed the
tional exercise, presented the following assessment of NATO s force strength. Their defensive orientation of the Western alli-
data:12 assessments were based on intelligence find- ance or raised questions about the Warsaw
* A massive first strike by NATO with ings and judgments derived by the Ministry Pact s offensive plans. Moreover, NATO s
nuclear weapons in the Western Theater for State Security and the military intelli- forces and operational plans were systemati-
of War gence organs of the NVA from original cally misrepresented to conform with an
* a total of 2,714 strikes (without France) NATO and Bundeswehr documents, which ideologically-grounded, aggressive image
* a total of 2,874 strikes (with France) included such items as data from the logistics of the enemy, which in turn served as a
Follow-on nuclear strikes by NATO command of the West German army during rationale for the Warsaw Pact s own offen-
* a total of 1,528 strikes (without France) 1984 and all the WINTEX materials since sive military doctrine and planning.
* a total of 1,624 strikes (with France) 1983.15 These assessments, however, were
It is illustrative of the climate of decep- simply disregarded during the NVA s exer- APPENDIX (ENDNOTES)
tion, secrecy, and obfuscation in the NVA cises.
regarding the intentions and capabilities of Evidence from the time attests to fre- Unless otherwise indicated, original documents
cited in this report can be found in the Document
NATO that despite information to the con- quent disagreements between the directors
Division of the Seventh Regional Administration of the
trary provided by the NVA intelligence di- of intelligence and the officers on the NVA s
Armed Forces.
rector, a then-deputy Chief of Staff of the Main Staff responsible for military opera-
Warsaw Pact could declare at the GDR tions, who found that the enemy numbers
1. Over the years, the GDR Defense Ministry main-
tained a very detailed chronicle of the most important
Defense Ministry in 1983 that if opera- were insufficient for their planning. Under
results of all training exercises. The chronicle, which is
tional targets are not met, NATO plans to orders from the Main Staff, extra NATO
relatively free of political overtones, offers a clear view
escalate to the use of nuclear weapons with forces were ingeniously located, so that,
of the activities and status of the NVA. The chronicle
a total of over 5,000 nuclear warheads, of for example, in addition to the 12 Bundeswehr
will remain a basic source for scholarly research on the
NVA for many years to come, even though some
which 2,800 would be used in the first divisions there were now 17 (!) French divi-
portions of the text, unfortunately, have been destroyed
nuclear strike. 13 sions. Even the Spanish armed forces were
or are missing.
factored in as a source of additional offensive
2. There are some 30 cartons of detailed NVA docu-
Depiction of NATO s Forces and Intentions potential in Central Europe.
ments on the Comrades-in-Arms-80 exercises. This
material makes a good source for both historical re-
This ideological depiction of an ag- There is no doubt that the highest-rank-
search and operational-tactical matters.
gressive NATO and Bundeswehr was main- ing commanders of the NVA were fully
3. The Soyuz-83 exercise is the only one of the Soyuz
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